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Are Bond Ratings Informative?  
Evidence from Regulatory Regime Changes 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The recent Dodd-Frank Act (Section 939B) enacted in 2010 repeals credit rating agencies’ (CRAs) 
exemption from Regulation Fair Disclosure. We test whether CRAs continue to provide new 
information to the market after the repeal. We find that the significant pre-repeal stock price 
responses to rating changes disappear after the regime change. Bond price reactions however 
remain significant. These results are even more significant at the investment-speculative boundary. 
Our evidence suggests that CRAs serve as a conduit for transmitting private information before 
the repeal. It also shows that regulatory constraint is a channel by which credit ratings affect cost 
of financing.  
 
 
 Keywords: Credit Ratings; Market Reactions; Rating-Contingent Regulation; Regulation Fair 
Disclosure; Dodd-Frank Act; Section 939B  
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1. Introduction 
Numerous studies have shown that credit ratings are relevant to valuation of corporate 
securities, and hence cost of capital.  In particular, both stock and bond prices react negatively to 
announcements of bond rating downgrades, while the evidence regarding stock market reactions 
to rating upgrades is weak.1  In addition to actual rating changes, existing studies also documented 
significant market reactions when a firm is placed on S&P’s Credit Watch lists.2    
At least three hypotheses have been advanced to explain why security prices react to rating 
changes by credit rating agencies (CRAs).  First, bond ratings may reflect non-public information 
that CRAs receive from management (Ederington and Goh (1998) and Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005)).  
Second, CRAs are specialists in the information gathering and evaluation process and thereby 
provide information certification on the values of firms they rate (Millon and Thakor (1985) 
and Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006)). Third, rather than conveying new information, market 
reactions to rating changes, especially bond market reactions, could be due to rating-contingent 
regulations that favor higher rated debt securities (Bongaerts, Cremers, and Goetzmann (2012) and 
Opp, Opp, and Harris (2013)). While the first two hypotheses focus on CRA’s ability in 
information production, the third emphasizes the role of regulatory constraints. 
Given the growing literature on how credit ratings affect corporate decisions and cost of 
                                           
1 Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) uncover a two-day abnormal return of -2.66% for downgrades but an insignificant 
abnormal return of +0.08% for upgrades. Goh and Ederington (1993) find common stock reacts negatively to 
downgrades associated with deteriorating financial prospects. Dichev and Piotroski (2001) report a three-day stock 
price effect of -1.97% for downgrades and +0.48% for upgrades. Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005) find increased stock 
prices reaction to downgrades and upgrades in the post Reg FD period. Hand, Holthausen, Leftwich (1992) find 
significant bond market reactions to both upgrades and downgrades, a significant negative stock reaction to 
downgrades but no significant stock market reaction to upgrades. May (2010) documents that bond market reacts 
significantly to both upgrades and downgrades, while the reaction to upgrades is economically small.  
2 Although not all credit watch eventually leads to a rating change in the end, market seems to react strongly to credit 
watches, suggesting that credit watch has information content. For example, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) and 
Hand et al. (1992) find significant abnormal returns are associated with announcements of additions to S&P’s Credit 
Watch List for both stock market and bond market. 
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financing, it is important to evaluate the channel by which credit ratings affect capital markets. We 
exploit the recent repeal of CRAs’ exemption from Regulation Fair Disclosure (henceforth the 
Repeal) to study the informational content of bond ratings in a quasi-natural experimental setting. 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), enacted in 2000, banned selective disclosure of non-public 
information to favored stock analysts or investors.  However, Reg FD explicitly exempted the 
CRAs, allowing management to share non-public information with them. Enacted in 2010, Section 
939B of the Dodd-Frank Act, revoked CRAs’ exemption from Reg FD.   
In this paper, we study both stock and bond price reactions to CRAs’ rating changes. 
Comparison between bond and stock market reactions before and after the Repeal is particularly 
interesting since rating-contingent regulations affect bond market more directly than stock market. 
In brief, the “information production” explanations predict that the Repeal should have similar 
effect on both bond and stock markets. However, the “regulatory effect” hypothesis predicts that 
the Repeal should have differential impact on bond versus stock market reactions to bond rating 
changes. Specifically, if market reactions to rating actions occurred because the ratings reflect non-
public information, then both stock and bond price reactions to rating changes should disappear 
after the Repeal. On the other hand, the highly-skilled information processing hypothesis suggests 
that the Repeal will not have any effect on either bond or stock price reactions. Finally, the 
“regulatory effect” hypothesis predicts that the Repeal will result in reduced stock market reaction 
to bond rating changes but it will not affect bond price reaction.  
Consistent with existing studies, we document statistically significant bond and stock price 
reactions to rating changes, for both downgrades and upgrades, prior to the Repeal. More 
importantly, after the Repeal, the stock market reaction to rating actions is substantially reduced 
and no longer statistically significant.  In contrast, we find no evidence of a significant difference 
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in bond price reactions before and after the Repeal.  The contrasting result for stock versus bond 
price reactions has implications on the relevancy of the above-mentioned explanations.  The 
decrease in the magnitude of the stock price reaction to rating changes after the Repeal is consistent 
with the reasoning that CRAs possessed private information attributable to their exemption from 
Reg FD, however, this informational advantage is lost after the Repeal.  In contrast, the finding of 
Repeal having no significant effect on bond price reaction may be attributed to the rating-
contingent regulatory effect. We further observe that bond price reaction is significantly stronger 
for the sample of bonds whose ratings were downgraded from investment to speculative grades, 
or were upgraded from speculative to investment grades. We do not observe these patterns from 
stock price reactions. Therefore, our results lend support for the regulatory effect hypothesis. 
Lastly, we study bond and stock price reactions surrounding a firm’s addition to the Credit 
Watch list. As Boot, Milbourn and Schmeits (2006) articulate, credit watch procedure increases 
the informational value of credit rating changes. Since most negative (positive) Credit Watch 
placements are followed by rating downgrades (upgrades), these Credit Watches serve as an 
effective leading indicator of future rating changes, and therefore may also impact bond and stock 
prices. We find similar patterns of price reactions to Credit Watch placements, which further 
reinforces the results from actual credit rating changes.  The significant stock market reaction to 
Credit Watch placements disappeared after the Repeal. Bond market reactions to Credit Watch 
placements remain statistically significant both before and after the Repeal.   
In summary, our findings show that Section 939B of the Dodd-Frank Act effectively 
leveled the playing field for both the stock analysts and CRAs. As a result of the repeal of the 
exemption from Reg FD, the CRAs have essentially lost their privileged access to private 
information. The lost of privilege is manifested in the lack of significance in the stock price 
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reaction to rating changes after the Repeal. In addition, the fact that there is no disparity between 
the pre- and post-Repeal bond price reactions to rating changes highlights the role of regulations 
in bond pricing. This is one of the main source of CRAs’ influence in the bond market. Bond 
investors depend highly on the opinion of CRAs through their ratings, especially investors that 
face regulatory requirements to hold investment grade debt instruments.   
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on how credit ratings affect corporate 
decisions and cost of capital (e.g., An and Chan (2008), Driss, Massoud, and Roberts (2016), Sufi 
(2009)). Our paper shows that while credit rating agencies may be viewed as information producers 
in the past, the regulatory effect are increasingly important. Our results imply that the regulatory 
effect of credit ratings would significantly affect bond market prices and hence affect cost of debt 
financing. In addition, though our focus is not on the consequences of Dodd Frank Act itself, we 
use the Repeal (Section 939B of the Act) as the test setting. As such, some of our empirical results 
are related to studies that directly investigate the impact of Dodd-Frank Act on the financial 
markets.  For example, Dimitrov, Palia and Tang (2015) investigate the impact of the Act on the 
quality of credit ratings and find that CRAs issue lower ratings, give more false warnings, and 
issue downgrades that are less informative after the passage of the Act. Our empirical findings, 
especially on the bond market reaction to rating changes, and for both bond and stock price 
responses to Credit Watch placements complement their findings.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section reviews existing 
theories as to why bond rating announcements impact stock and bond prices and develops testable 
hypotheses on how the Repeal would influence both market reactions to rating actions.  Section 3 
describes the data and methodology.  Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Existing Theories on the Impact of Rating Actions on Stock and Bond Prices 
Many explanations have been advanced to explain why stock and bond prices react to bond 
rating changes. In this paper, we consider three completing explanations. First, ratings are viewed 
by investors as partially reflecting inside information that CRAs have access to. Second, CRAs 
have the reputation of superior skills in information gathering and processing. Third, ratings 
directly impact demand for bonds because regulations favor investment grade over speculative 
grade bonds.  We consider each explanation in turn and discuss testable implications given the 
passage of the Repeal.   
 
2.1 Inside Information Revelation 
The rating agencies have long claimed that their ratings are based partially on inside 
information.  For example, S&P states that they have “Nonpublic information frequently includes 
budgets and forecasts, as well as advance notification of major corporate events such as a merger.”3 
As such, ratings may serve as a conduit for transmitting inside information from the firm to 
investors; the distillation of this information into letter ratings would provide a possible mechanism 
of conveying relevant aspects of this information to investors without divulging harmful details to 
the borrowing firm’s competitors.   
Thus, the “inside information revelation” hypothesis of market reactions to credit rating 
actions alludes to the notion that investors view CRAs as having private material information, and 
rating actions convey this information to the market.  This hypothesis is seemingly supported by 
the existing findings that the market reacts more to downgrades than to upgrades.  Since firms have 
an incentive to publicly disclose favorable information and sit on unfavorable news (Chen, Hong, 
                                           
3 Letter from Deven Sharma, the President of S&P on July 16, 2010. 
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and Stein (2000)), it is more likely that downgrades reflect inside information.4   The inside 
information explanation is further supported by Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005), who found an 
increased stock market reaction to downgrades after SEC’s adoption of Reg FD in 2000, which  
CRAs are exempted from, thereby allowing them privileged access to inside information.   
Section 939B of the Dodd-Frank Act effectively removed the rating agencies’ exemption 
from Reg FD starting from Oct. 4, 2010.  Hence, if bond and stock prices previously reacted to 
rating announcements because investors thought they reflected inside information about the firm’s 
condition or prospects, we should observe significant reduction in both stock and bond market 
reactions to rating actions after the Repeal.  
 
2.2 Skilled Information Processors 
 An alternative to the inside information revelation hypothesis centers around the argument 
that CRAs specialize in the information gathering and evaluation process, and have reputation as 
skilled information processors (Millon and Thakor (1985) and Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits 
(2006)). Partnoy (2006) points out that CRAs believe they are capable of publishing accurate 
unsolicited ratings even if they have no access to management or inside information.5 
             Credit rating agencies, relying on their reputation capital, may certify the borrowers at a 
lower cost (Sufi (2009)). First, CRAs, may be especially skilled at evaluating information, even 
non-private, and assessing its consequences for investors. Second, it may simply be more efficient 
                                           
4 Studies finding more significant market reactions to downgrades include Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand, 
Holthausen, Leftwich (1992), Dichev and Piotroski (2001), and May (2010). 
5 Further, as Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2014) suggest, unsolicited ratings increases the rating agencies’ reputation 
by demonstrating to investors that they are able to resist the temptation to issue inflated ratings. Griffin and Tang 
(2012), Griffin, Nickerson, and Tang (2013), Xia (2014), Cornaggia and Cornaggia (2013), Cornaggia, Cornaggia, 
and Xia (2016) also point out conflicts of interest can play a role in the ratings process.  
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and less costly for a few specialized CRAs to gather the information and analyze the borrower’s 
creditworthiness than for thousands of investors to repeat the same process independently.  
            Given these arguments, market reactions to credit rating changes may be due to CRA’s 
reputation as skilled information processors. Specifically, CRAs can be viewed as skilled 
interpreters of even non-private information and market investors trust and rely on CRAs when 
analyzing the firms’ prospects. 6  If this is the case, then the Repeal, which eliminates CRAs’ access 
to private information, should have little impact on their information processing skills. Therefore, 
the skilled information processing hypothesis suggests that the Repeal should have little or no 
impact on both stock and bond market reactions to rating actions.  
 
2.3 Rating-Contingent Regulation Effect 
A third explanation as to why capital markets react to rating changes is based not on 
information production but on the existence of rating-contingent regulations that favor highly rated 
securities. The SEC’s introduction of nationally recognized statistical rating organization 
(NRSRO) concept in the mid-1970s encouraged increased statutory reliance on CRAs’ ratings.  
Examples of these rules include: (1) the requirements that certain investors such as banks, pension 
funds, and insurance companies can only invest in bonds with high ratings, and (2) the reduction 
of capital requirements for institutions that purchased highly rated bonds.  Moreover, some private 
contracts and state government regulations may also be rating contingent (Darbellay and Partnoy 
(2012) and Opp et al. (2013)).7  For instance, private sector contracts may contain triggers that 
                                           
6 Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) also point out that the effectiveness of certifiers relies on investors’ trust. 
7 Empirically, Chen, Lookman, Schurhoff, and Seppi (2014) find that institutional investors with ratings-based 
portfolio constraints substantially increase their holdings in the bonds that are mechanically upgraded to investment 
grade. Kisgen and Strahan (2010) find that ratings-based regulations on bond investments affect a firm’s cost of debt 
capital. Becker and Ivashina (2015) find that insurance companies prefer to hold higher rated bonds, consistent with 
lower rated bonds bearing higher capital requirements.  
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require the posting of additional collateral or immediate repayment, should a security or entity be 
downgraded.  In this context, CRAs need not to be viewed as “information intermediaries” but as 
“regulatory licensors”. Therefore, rating changes, especially downgrades could trigger a demand 
shift out of bonds due to regulatory or contractual concerns, independent of any information 
content (Darbellay and Partnoy (2012)).  In other words, a downgrade reduces the demand for a 
bond, not because investors view the rating as conveying information, but because some investors 
are no longer able to hold the bond or because they divest their holdings for fear of a further 
downgrade.  Consistent with this view, studies conducted using data prior to the SEC’s 
introduction of NRSROs and enhanced rating reference in 1970s, generally found weaker market 
reactions to rating changes (Pinches and Singleton (1978)).   
The regulatory effect hypothesis has a couple of testable implications.  First, this hypothesis 
implies a significant bond price reaction to rating actions, as the rating actions directly trigger 
shifts in demand for bond securities. As such, bond price responses should not be affected by the 
Repeal. Second, the bond price reaction should be largest when the ratings are changed from 
investment grade to speculative grade classes, or vice-versa.  Rating changes within the investment 
or speculative grade classes might have some effects since they change the probability that a future 
rating change will move a bond from investment to speculative grade or vice-versa. But these price 
reactions should be of a smaller magnitude compared to rating changes that cross the investment-
speculative grade boundary.  
In summary, both bond and stock market reactions before and after the Repeal will 
highlight which of these theories can best explain the relevance of bond ratings.  The testable 
hypotheses are summarized in Table 1. To aid in our exposition, we use rating downgrades as an 
example.  
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
As summarized in Table 1, if CRAs indeed have access to private information, then both 
stock and bond price reactions to downgrades should be negative before the Repeal, but both price 
reactions will be largely reduced or disappear in the post Repeal period.  If the skilled information-
processing hypothesis dominates, then we should observe negative reactions for both stock and 
bond markets for both pre- and post-Repeal periods.  Finally, the regulatory effect hypothesis 
predicts that bond market reaction to credit actions should not be affected by the Repeal. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
To examine why rating actions affect security prices, this study uses the enactment of 
Section 939B of the Dodd-Frank Act on October 4, 2010 as a quasi-natural experiment.  We use 
the standard event study methodology to assess market reactions to rating actions by CRAs and 
compare both the bond and stock market reactions to rating announcements for the period before 
and after the Repeal.  The post-Repeal period begins from October 5, 2010 and ends in June 30, 
2013. The pre-Repeal period begins from February 1, 2008 and ends in October 2, 2010.  Note 
that the choice of two equally spanned periods (32 months) around the policy implementation is 
consistent with Jorion et al (2005), though the actual pre-Repeal period starts from the passage of 
Reg FD in 2000. Besides examining market reactions to credit rating changes, we also explore the 
reactions to Credit Watch placements.  
Our data come from five sources: (1) Data on all S&P corporate bond rating actions from 
Capital IQ S&P (previously known as S&P’s RatingsXpress) data services; (2) bond transaction 
prices from Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE); (3) bond characteristics, such as 
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coupon and maturity from Mergent FISD database; (4) daily individual stock and stock market 
returns from CRSP; (5) accounting data from Compustat. 
 
3.1 Rating Changes and Credit Watch 
We gather data on all rating actions by Capital IQ S&P data services, which report a 
complete history of S&P’s credit rating actions, including placements on Credit Watch.  A firm is 
put on Credit Watch when “an event or deviation from an expected trend has occurred or is 
expected, and additional information is necessary to take a rating action … such rating reviews 
[are] normally completed within 90 day[s]”.8  Credit Watch placements are designated “positive” 
(possible upgrade), “negative” (possible downgrade), or “developing” (used for those unusual 
situations in which future events are so unclear that both upgrade and downgrade are possible). 
  
3.2 Estimation of Stock Abnormal Returns 
Following Jorion et al. (2005), the daily stock abnormal return is estimated as the difference 
between the daily raw stock return Rn,t and the contemporaneous value-weighted 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index return Rm,t.  Cumulative abnormal returns, CARs, are calculated 
over the two-day event window (0, +1), where day 0 is the new rating effective day as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑡 = ∑(𝑅𝑛,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
+1
𝑡=0
)          (1) 
Since there is substantial cross-sectional variation in the volatility of excess returns, we also follow 
the standard event-study approach that relies on the standardized CAR.9 
 
                                           
8 Standard and Poor’s Corporate Ratings Criteria (2006), page 14-15. 
9 Our results are qualitatively unchanged, using either (-1,+1) or (-3,+3) window. 
12 
 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑛 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑛
𝜎(𝑅𝑛 − 𝑅𝑚)√2
        (2) 
 
Where the standard error of CAR in the denominator of equation (2) is computed over the one-
year period ending 6 months before the event day.  
 
3.3 Estimation of Bond Abnormal Returns 
Our calculation of bond returns rely on daily actual transaction prices from Trade Reporting 
and Compliance Engine (TRACE) database and largely follow methods developed by 
Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) and modified by Ederington, Guan, and Yang 
(2015). Individual Bond returns from day t-x to t+y are calculated as follows, 
 
𝑅(𝑡 − 𝑥, 𝑡 + 𝑦)𝑛   =     
𝑃𝑛,𝑡+𝑦+𝑃𝑛,𝑡−𝑥 + ∆𝐴𝐼𝑛
𝑃𝑛,𝑡−𝑥 + 𝐴𝐼𝑛,𝑡−𝑥
               (3) 
 
where Pn,t is the trade-size-weighted average “clean” price of bond n on day t and ΔAI n is the 
change in accrued interest on bond n from day t-x to day t+y.  To control for macroeconomic 
factors impacting bond prices, we derive bond abnormal returns by subtracting each bond return 
from benchmark returns on bonds of similar maturity and risk.  Specifically, bond abnormal returns 
are calculated as follows: 
 
𝐵𝐴𝑅(𝑡 − 𝑥, 𝑡 + 𝑦)𝑛 =  𝑅(𝑡 − 𝑥, 𝑡 + 𝑦)𝑛 −  𝐵𝑀(𝑡 − 𝑥, 𝑡 + 𝑦)𝑛       (4) 
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Where bond Rn is raw bond return, BMn is the mean return on a rating/maturity matched 
benchmark portfolio corresponding to each bond.  We assign bonds into one of the 24 benchmark 
portfolios based on rating and maturity – six rating classes (AAA and AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and 
below B) and four maturity groupings (1 to 3 years, 3+ to 5 years, 5+ to 10 years, and over 10 
years). 
We then standardize event window bond returns by a bond’s estimated return volatility, 
out of two major reasons. First, bond returns are characterized by considerable cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity, making test statistics based on unstandardized bond abnormal returns likely 
mis-specified.  More importantly, cross-sectional comparison of the returns on bonds with 
different maturity and rating are less meaningful.  For example, a 2% price change is common for 
20-year B-rated bonds but rare for 2-year AA-rated notes. The standard deviations for this 
standardization procedure are estimated using the standard deviation of returns over the period 
from 100 days to 5 days prior to the event day t.  
Event studies on stock market commonly examine two-day or one-day returns around the 
announcement date, such as (0, 1).  If we calculate bond returns in the same way, then bond price 
observations are required on both day 0 and day +1.  However, since bonds trade very infrequently, 
requiring transaction price observations on both day t and t+1 would eliminate many bond 
observations and tend to bias the sample toward larger firms with more actively traded bonds.10  
Therefore, we enlarge the event window to (-3, +3). For example, if a bond has price observations 
on day t-1, t+2, and t+3 only, then returns for (-1, +2), and (-1, +3) are calculated and averaged 
together as the {-3, +3} composite return for this bond. 
                                           
10 Ederington et al. (2015) find evidence showing that on any day t during the sample period, only 31.3% of the 
bond/days have trade prices on consecutive two days. 
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Since the credit rating actions are assessed at the entity level, and firms usually have 
multiple bonds outstanding, we aggregate individual bond returns at the firm level.  As pointed out 
by Bessembinder et al. (2009), treating each bond as a separate observation both biases the sample 
toward larger firms with multiple bonds and (more importantly) leads to correlated returns biasing 
the test statistics.  Hence, we calculate firm level standardized bond abnormal returns (SBAR) as 
the weighted average of all individual bonds’ SBARs, where the weight is size of each bond for 
the same firm.   
 
3.4  Sample Description and Summary Statistics 
We begin by collecting all rating actions for US firms from February 1, 2008 through June 
30, 2013 from the Capital IQ S&P rating database.  We only include industrial firms and exclude 
utility, financial and regulated firms (SIC code between 4900 and 4999 or between 6000 and 6999).  
We also exclude from our sample sovereign entities such as “Federal Reserve System”.  During 
our sample period, we identify 2,554 rating changes at the entity level, of which 1,586 are 
downgrades and 968 are upgrades.  We use rating actions at the firm level, instead of instrument 
level due to the following considerations.  First, the firm-level rating changes reflect the change in 
the fundamentals of the firm and these in turn will have an impact on both stock and bond prices. 
Second, if we treat each instrument as individual sample observation, then test statistics will be 
biased since one firm may have multiple rating actions at the same time.  
A potential concern in correctly assessing the information content of rating changes is 
whether the announcement of rating action is contaminated by other firm-specific press releases.  
To mitigate this concern, we eliminate observations that are "contaminated" by other public news 
releases (Hand et al. (1992), Goh and Ederington (1993), and Jorion et al. (2005)).  To search for 
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contaminating events, we merge the sample of rating changes with firm’s form 8K, 10Q, 10K 
filings with the SEC (EDGAR) and earnings announcement dates from Compustat.  
Announcements of earnings report, mergers & acquisitions, security offerings, share buybacks, 
debt repayments, and CEO/CFO assignments and departures are considered as material 
information.  We then search Factiva for the material news that are not filed with the SEC.  An 
observation is considered as contaminated if any firm-specific material announcements occur 
within a 7-day window surrounding the event day of a rating change.  Finally, we exclude from 
our analysis, firms that are in default. 
Our final clearn sample consists of 1,643 rating changes, of which 991 are downgrades and 
652 are upgrades.  Some firms have more than one firm-level rating actions during the entire 
sample period, and there are 915 unique firms experiencing rating actions.  Of which, 837 firms 
have stock returns in CRSP, and but only 281 firms have usable bond returns from TRACE. 11   
There are two primary reasons why firms may have bond ratings but no bond prices during event 
windows.  First, some firms’ bonds are privately held and therefore are not covered by TRACE.  
Second, some firms’ bonds trade very infrequently, thus, even if a firm has bond are publicly 
traded, it may have no trades within the rating event window.  For our Credit Watch placements 
sample, we use the same filtering rules to weed out contaminated events.  Our final Credit Watch 
placement sample contains 353 negative and 151 positive credit watches. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 provides number of credit rating downgrades, upgrades, negative and positive 
Credit Watch placements by year and by sub-sample period.  The upgrades to downgrades ratio is 
low for the pre-Repeal period and is in line with previous studies (Jorion et al. (2005)).  The ratio 
                                           
11 Those firms with rating actions and no stock returns in CRSP are likely to have no publicly traded stocks or are 
subsidiaries having stocks traded under their parents’ name.  
16 
 
is lowest for year 2008, which may reflect the deteriorating economic condition during the 
financial crisis.   
 
4. Empirical Results  
4.1 Univariate Evidence 
4.1.1 Stock Market Reaction 
Mean and median stock market reactions to rating downgrades and upgrades in the pre- 
and post-Repeal periods are summarized in Table 3.  Panel A reports the cumulative abnormal 
stock returns (CARs) and Panel B reports the standardized CARs.  Table 3 highlights several 
interesting observations.  For the downgrade sample, the mean CAR in the pre-Repeal period is -
2.26% and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  However, after the Repeal, the mean CAR is 
reduced to -0.52% and is not statistically significant.  The difference in CARs before and after the 
Repeal is -1.74% and is statistically significant at the 5% level.  We find similar results for the 
standardized CARs. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
For upgrades, the mean CAR in the pre-Repeal period is 0.72% and is statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  The mean standardized CAR in the same period is 0.11 and is not 
significant.  In the post-Repeal period, none of the mean or median CARs are statistically 
significant.  The difference in CARs for the upgrade sample between the pre and post Repeal 
periods is significant at the 10% level. In sum, stock price responses to both credit rating changes, 
especially rating downgrades, were significant before the Repeal, but the responses disappeared 
after the Repeal. 
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4.1.2 Bond Market Reaction 
Table 4 summarizes the mean and median bond price reactions to credit rating changes.  
The bond market reacts strongly to both downgrades and upgrades, and both before and after the 
Repeal.  Prior to the Repeal, downgrades are associated with an SBAR of -0.33.  To gain an 
economic sense of this figure, with a standard deviation of an average bond in our sample of 1.62%, 
the -0.33 SBAR translates into (-0.33 * 1.62%) = -0.535% unstandardized bond abnormal return 
(BAR).12   For equities (CARs), this magnitude would be considered small but in the bond market, 
it represents a substantial price reaction.  For the average bond that are upgraded in our sample, 
the SBAR translates into a BAR of (0.43 * 1.62%) = 0.697%. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
After the Repeal, the mean bond SBAR for downgrades is -0.25 and statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  For an average bond, this figure translates into a BAR of (-0.25 * 1.62%) = -
0.405%.  The difference between the pre- and post-Repeal period mean and median SBAR is not 
statistically significant. These findings suggest that unlike the stock market, bond price responses 
to both downgrades and upgrades are significant, both before and after the Repeal. 
 
4.1.3 Stock and Bond Market Reaction to Credit Watch Placements 
Besides credit rating changes, previous studies have documented significant market 
reactions to Credit Watch placements.  A bond analyst may place the firm under Credit Watch list, 
if the odds of a subsequent change in credit rating are reasonably high.  The analyst will then 
                                           
12 Since standard deviation varies quite a lot among different rating and maturity bonds, the SBAR translates to a much 
smaller change for short-term high-rated bonds and much larger for long-term low-rated bonds. For example, it 
translates to (-.33 * 2.4%) = -0.79% for a bond rated B with 10+ years to maturity and to (-.33 * 0.53%) = -0.17% for 
a bond AAA or AA with 1-3 years to maturity. 
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review the rating, and possibly meet the management during the process.13  The rating committee 
will then evaluate the case as presented by the analyst, and decides whether or not to change the 
rating.  
Table 5 summarizes both bond and stock market reactions to Credit Watch placements 
before and after the Repeal.  Panel A reports the cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs), Panel 
B reports the standardized CARs, and Panel C presents the standardized bond abnormal returns 
(SBARs).  Results for stock price responses to Credit Watch placements are similar to rating 
changes. Specifically, for the negative watch sample, the mean CAR in the pre-Repeal period is -
3.81% and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  However, after the Repeal, the mean CAR is 
-0.18% and is no longer significant.  The difference in CARs before and after the Repeal is -3.63% 
and is statistically significant at the 5% level. For the positive watch sample, the mean and 
standardized CARs in both the pre and post Repeal period do not clear the 5% significance level. 
We find similar results for the standardized CARs. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Bond price responses to Credit Watches placement are reported in Table 5, Panel C. the 
mean SBARs are -0.35 and -0.54, respectively for both the pre- and post-Repeal periods for 
negative watches.  They are statistically significant at the 1% level. For positive watch sample, the 
mean SBARs are 0.32 and 0.37, respectively for both the pre- and post-Repeal period and they are 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  For both negative and positive watch samples, the 
differences in the bond price reactions before and after the Repeal are not significant. 
Overall, our univariate findings suggest that before the Repeal, rating changes and Credit 
Watch placements are informative for stock market, and such credit actions brought new 
                                           
13 Standard & Poor’s, 2005, “Corporate Ratings Criteria 2006,” Standard & Poor’s Inc, page 10. 
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information to the capital market. However, the removal of Reg FD exemption by Dodd-Frank 
Act brings this informational advantage of CRAs to a grinding halt. In addition, our results suggest 
that the notion that CRAs are skilled interpreters of public information is not supported 
empirically.  Importantly, our results suggest that CRAs still matter to the bond market and it may 
be attributed to the fact that credit rating agencies are considered as “regulatory licensors”. 
 
4.2 Multiple Regression Analyses  
In this section, we conduct multiple regression tests so that we can control for other factors 
that could affect the market reactions.  To determine the magnitude of a rating change, we assign 
cardinal values to the current and prior ratings; we then compute the change in credit ratings.  We 
assign a numerical value to each rating on notch basis as follows: AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA-
=4, A+=5, A=6, A-=7, BBB+=8, BBB=9, BBB-=10, BB+=11, BB=12, BB-=13, B+=14, B=15, 
B-=16, CCC+=17, CCC=18, CCC-=19, CC=20, C=21.14  A number less than 11 indicates an 
“investment grade” rating.  Similar to Jorion et al. (2005), we perform regressions separately for 
upgrades and downgrades in the following form: 
 
Ret = α + β1Rating_Change + β2REPEAL+ β3CreditWatch + β4CROSS     (5) 
 
Where Ret represents one of the stock or bond return measures. Rating_Change is the magnitude 
of the rating change.  CreditWatch is a dummy variable equal to one if a rating change is preceded 
by a credit watch.  REPEAL is a dummy variable equal to one if a rating action occurs after 4th 
October, 2010.  CROSS is a dummy variable equal to one for a downgrade from investment to 
                                           
14 We exclude observations that are downgraded to default. 
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speculative grade or an upgrade from speculative to investment grade. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 reports the results for stock price reaction to rating changes.  We perform both OLS 
and GLS regressions.  The GLS regression includes weighted analysis of variance in order to 
control for heteroscedasticity.  For the downgrade sample, the intercept is significantly negative, 
suggesting that downgrades are bad news to shareholders.  More importantly, the coefficient of 
the REPEAL dummy is positive and significant, suggesting that the negative stock market reaction 
to downgrade is largely reduced after the Repeal.  We find similar patterns for the upgrades.  The 
coefficient on the REPEAL dummy is negative and significant, opposite to the sign of the intercept.  
These results are qualitatively similar for both OLS and GLS regressions.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Table 7 presents the multiple regression analysis for bond returns.  Since the bond returns 
are already standardized, we only perform OLS regressions.  For downgrades, the intercept is 
negative and significant, suggesting that bond price drops in response to downgrades.  More 
importantly, the coefficient of the REPEAL dummy is insignificant, suggesting that the Repeal 
has no impact on the bond market reaction as far as rating changes are concerned.  This is consistent 
with our univariate findings in Table 4.  The coefficient on the CreditWatch dummy is also not 
significant, suggesting that bond market reacts to the rating change even though they are largely 
expected.  Moreover, the coefficient on the CROSS dummy is statistically and economically 
significant. In contrast, note that the coefficient estimation of CROSS dummy in the stock response 
regression in Table 6 is not significant.  These results provide further support to the hypothesis 
that bond price responses are at least partially attributable to rating-contingent regulations. We find 
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similar results for the upgrades in that the coefficient of the REPEAL dummy is insignificant and 
the coefficient on the CROSS dummy is statistically and economically significant.  
In summary, results from the multiple regressions suggest that bond market reaction to 
credit rating changes is not affected by the repeal of Reg FD exemption.  Moreover, the 
significantly stronger bond (but not stock) market reaction to change from investment grade to 
speculative grade (and vice versa) further supports the notion that the rating-contingent regulation 
plays a part in the bond market reaction to rating actions. 
 
5. Conclusion  
We use the effect of Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (Section 939B) as quasi-natural experiment 
to study the reasons for the extensively documented credit rating announcements affecting security 
valuation and cost of financing. We examine the potential alternative hypotheses: 1) private 
information revelation hypothesis, which states that ratings are viewed as bringing important inside 
information to the market, 2) skilled information processing hypothesis that the CRAs are viewed 
as information specialists and their reputation capital allows them to play a certification role, and 
3) regulatory effect hypothesis that the rating changes directly impact the demand for certain 
securities due to rating-based regulations that favor highly rated bonds. 
We find that rating changes are indeed informative and it brings new information to the 
capital market, until CRAs’ informational advantage is removed by the Repeal. This finding lends 
support to the private information hypothesis until the Repeal. Our findings cast doubt on the 
hypothesis that portrays CRAs as skilled interpreters of information. As the Repeal per se should 
not reduce CRAs’ skills, as such, we should not have observed a reduced stock market reaction to 
rating actions after the Repeal. However, one might argue that it is possible that CRAs’ loss of 
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reputation occurs concurrently with the Repeal.  However, if this is the case, it is hard to reconcile 
with our findings that credit actions still matter in bond markets after the Repeal.  Finally, both our 
bond market reaction and regression results support the regulatory effect hypothesis that rating-
contingent regulation may be the reason why the bond market still reacts to rating actions despite 
the removal of CRAs’ exemption from Reg FD.  
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Table 1 Summary of Testable Hypotheses  
 
This table summarizes the testable hypotheses on the relevance of credit rating downgrade announcements for both the stock and bond 
markets before and after the Repeal of CRA’s exemption from Reg FD. 
 
Theories Before the Repeal of Reg FD Exemption  After the Repeal of Reg FD Exemption  
  Stock CAR  Bond SBAR Stock CAR Bond SBAR 
Private Information Revelation <0 <0 =0 =0 
      
Skilled Information Processing <0 <0 <0 <0 
      
Rating-Contingent Regulation =0 <0 =0 <0 
 
 
 
  
27 
 
Table 2 Summary Statistics  
 
The whole sample consists of 991 downgrades and 652 upgrades of U.S. industrial firms during the period from February 2008 to June 
2013.The sample is split roughly into two 32-month periods: before the Repeal period from February 2008 to Oct 3, 2010 and after the 
Repeal from Oct 5, 2010 to June 2013. Contaminated rating actions are excluded. Contaminating events are identified by searching the 
SEC filings, earnings announcements and Factiva news. An observation is considered as contaminated if there exists any material 
information within a seven-day window surrounding the event day of rating changes.  
 
 
Year N Downgrades  N Upgrades  N Negative Watches  N Positive Watches 
2008 230  88  120  16 
2009 267  85  85  33 
2010 141  166  48  37 
2011 131  139  40  30 
2012 133  102  41  22 
2013 89  72  23  13 
        
Before Repeal 593  302  241  80 
After Repeal 398  350  
116 
 
71 
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Table 3 Stock Market Reaction to Credit Rating Changes 
 
 
The whole sample consists of 991 downgrades and 652 upgrades by US industrial firms during 
February 2008 to June 2013. The sample is split equally into two periods: before the Repeal period 
from February 2008 to Oct 3, 2010 and after the Repeal from Oct 5, 2010 to June 2013. Panel A 
reports the results for stock CARs. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return defined as the raw stock 
return minus the contemporaneous return on the value-weighted market portfolio, calculated over 
the two-day event window (0, +1), where day 0 is the effective date of a rating change. Panel B 
reports the results for standardized CAR, which is calculated by dividing CAR by its standard 
deviation estimated over the one year period ending 6 months before the event day. T-statistics are 
given in parentheses below the mean value. The significance level of the median is based on a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The difference in means T-statistic assumes unequal variances across 
groups when a test of equal variances is rejected at the 10 percent level. The significance level of 
the difference in medians is based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance better than the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: CAR (0, 1)             
    Downgrades       Upgrades   
Period Obs Mean (%) Median (%)   Obs Mean (%) Median (%) 
        Pre Repeal 301 -2.26*** -1.30***  189 0.72** 0.44** 
  (-3.22)    (2.40)  
Post Repeal 190 -0.52 -0.28 225 0.09 0.14 
   (-1.25)     (0.61)  
Diff  -1.74
** -1.02***   0.63
* 0.31 
    (-2.13)       (1.89)   
        
Panel B: Standardized CAR (0, 1)           
    Downgrades       Upgrades   
Period Obs Mean (%) Median (%)   Obs Mean (%) Median (%) 
        Pre Repeal 301 -0.49*** -0.32***  189 0.11 0.06 
  (-3.32)    (1.56)  
Post Repeal 190 -0.09 -0.11  225 0.03 0.05 
  (-0.94)    (0.66)  
Diff  -0.40
** -0.21***   0.07 0.01 
    (-2.28)        (0.88)   
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Table 4 Bond Market Reaction to Credit Rating Changes 
 
The whole sample consists of 991 downgrades and 652 upgrades of corporate bonds issued by US 
industrial firms during February 2008 to June 2013. The sample is split equally into two periods: 
before the Repeal period from February 2008 to Oct 3, 2010 and after the Repeal from Oct 5, 2010 
to June 2013. SBAR is standardized bond abnormal returns aggregated at the firm level. 
Standardized return is calculated as the standardized bond return minus the average standardized 
return on a maturity and rating matched portfolio. Individual bond return is standardized by its 
standard deviation estimated over the three-month period ending 6 days before the event day. T-
statistics are given in parentheses below the mean SBARs. The significance level of the median is 
based on a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The difference in means t-statistic assumes unequal 
variances across groups when a test of equal variances is rejected at the 10 percent level. The 
significance level of the difference in medians is based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. ***, ** and 
* indicate statistical significance better than the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
  
  
Downgrades 
    
  
Upgrades 
  
Period N Mean Median   N Mean Median 
        Pre Repeal 208 -0.33*** -0.25***  108 0.43
*** 0.40*** 
  (-5.87)      (5.94)  
Post Repeal 89 -0.25*** -0.21***  73 0.30
*** 0.26*** 
  (-3.46)      (4.35)  
        
Diff  -0.08 -0.04   0.13 0.14 
     (-1.35)           (0.83)   
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Table 5 Market Reaction to Credit Watches 
 
The whole sample consists of 353 negative watches and 151 positive watches of corporate bonds issued by 
US industrial firms during February 2008 to June 2013. The sample is split equally into two periods: before 
the Repeal period from February 2008 to Oct 3, 2010 and after the Repeal from Oct 5, 2010 to June 2013. 
Stock CAR is the cumulative abnormal return defined as the stock return minus the contemporaneous return 
on the value-weighted market portfolio, calculated over the two-day event window (0, +1), where day 0 is 
the effective date of a rating change. Standardized CAR is calculated by dividing CAR by its standard 
deviation estimated over the one year period ending 6 months before the event day. SBAR is bond abnormal 
standardized return calculated as the standardized bond return minus the average standardized return on a 
maturity and rating matched portfolio. Individual bond return is standardized by its standard deviation over 
the three-month period ending 6 days before the event day. T-statistics are given in parentheses below the 
mean CARs or SBARs. The significance level of the median is based on a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The 
significance level of the difference in medians is based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The difference in 
means t-statistic assumes unequal variances across groups when a test of equal variances is rejected at the 
10 percent level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance better than the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed 
levels, respectively. 
  
  Negative Watches 
 
  Positive Watches 
Panel A: Stock CARs 
period Obs Mean Median   Obs Mean Median 
        Pre Repeal 125 -3.81*** -2.07*** 
 
36 1.20 0.68   
(-3.37) 
   
    (1.19) 
 
Post Repeal 72 -0.18 -0.86 
 
37 2.96 1.17   
(-0.17) 
   
    (1.63) 
 
        
Diff 
 
-3.63** 
   
1.76 
 
    (-2.38)       (-0.84)           
Panel B: Standardized Stock CARs 
period Obs Mean Median   Obs Mean Median 
        Pre Repeal 125 -0.90*** -0.56*** 
 
36 0.16 0.12   
(-3.43) 
   
   (0.91) 
 
Post Repeal 72 0.35 -0.40 
 
37 1.10* 0.38   
-0.86 
   
   (1.78) 
 
        
Diff 
 
-1.25*** 
   
-0.94 -0.26 
     (-2.70)        (-1.43)           
Panel C: Standardized Bond Abnormal Returns 
period Obs Mean Median   Obs Mean Median 
        Pre Repeal 121 -0.35*** -0.24 
 
35 0.32* 0.10   
(-5.03) 
  
(1.75) 
 
Post Repeal 39 -0.54*** -0.54 
 
17 0.37* 0.25   
(-3.56) 
  
(1.94) 
 
        
Diff 
 
0.19 0.30 
  
-0.04 -0.16 
       (1.22)       (-0.15)   
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Table 6 Multiple Regressions of Stock Market Reaction  
 
The whole sample consists of 991 downgrades and 652 upgrades of corporate bonds issued by US 
industrial firms during February 2008 to June 2013. The sample is split equally into two periods: 
before the Repeal period from February 2008 to Oct 3, 2010 and after the Repeal from Oct 5, 2010 
to June 2013. The dependent variable CAR is the cumulative abnormal return defined as the stock 
return minus the contemporaneous return on the value-weighted market portfolio, calculated over 
the two-day event window (0, +1), where day 0 is the effective date of a rating change. REPEAL 
is a dummy variable equal to one if a rating change is effective during the post Repeal period and 
zero otherwise; Rating_Change is the absolute magnitude of the rating change, where categorical 
bond ratings are converted into a cardinal variable measured on a 21-point scale (1 for rating of 
AAA, 21 for rating of C); CROSS is a dummy variable set equal to one if a bond is revised from 
investment grade to speculative grade or vice versa, and zero otherwise. CreditWatch is a dummy 
variable set equal to one if a downgrade (upgrade) is preceded by a negative (positive) credit watch. 
OLS and GLS regressions are reported. The GLS regression conducts weighted analysis of 
variance which controls for heteroscedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance better 
than the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
  Downgrades   Upgrades 
  OLS GLS   OLS GLS 
      Intercept -0.0300*** -0.0193*** 
 
0.0084*** 0.0041*  
(-4.02) (-3.51) 
 
(3.07) (1.76) 
Rating_Change 0.0004 0.0001 
 
0.0002 0.0005  
(0.38) (0.11) 
 
(0.33) (1.09) 
REPEAL 0.0188** 0.0157*** 
 
-0.0065** -0.0023  
(1.96) (2.57) 
 
(-2.05) (-0.91) 
CROSS 0.0014 -0.0057 
 
-0.0006 0.0009  
(0.07) (-0.57) 
 
(-0.10) (0.25) 
CreditWatch 0.019* 0.0098 
 
-0.004 -0.0028  
(1.84) (1.50) 
 
(-0.98) (-0.91) 
      
R-square 0.0139 0.0168   0.012 0.0065 
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Table 7 Multiple Regressions of Bond Market Reaction  
 
The whole sample consists of 991 downgrades and 652 upgrades of corporate bonds issued by US 
industrial firms during February 2008 to June 2013. The sample is split equally into two periods: 
before the repeal period from February 2008 to Oct 3, 2010 and after the Repeal from Oct 5, 2010 
to June 2013. The dependent variable is firm-level SBAR, which is bond standardized abnormal 
returns aggregated at firm level. Individual bond return is standardized by its standard deviation 
over the three-month period ending 6 days before the event day. REPEAL is a dummy variable 
equal to one if an rating change is effective during the post Repeal period and zero otherwise; 
Rating_Change is the absolute magnitude of the rating change, where categorical bond ratings are 
converted into a cardinal variable measured on a 21-point scale (1 for rating of AAA, 21 for rating 
of C); CROSS is a dummy variable set equal to one if a bond is revised from investment grade to 
speculative grade or vice versa, and zero otherwise; CreditWatch is a dummy variable set equal to 
one if a downgrade (upgrade) is preceded by a negative (positive) credit watch. OLS regressions 
are reported, because the bond returns already control for heteroscedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance better than the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
       Downgrades          Upgrades 
    
Intercept -0.4167*** 
 
0.1545 
 
(-5.80) 
 
(1.55) 
Rating_Change 0.0414*** 
 
-0.1382*** 
 
(3.15) 
 
(-2.80) 
REPEAL 0.1153 
 
-0.0985 
 
(1.18) 
 
(-0.96) 
CROSS -0.3861** 
 
0.5718*** 
 
(-2.43) 
 
(3.27) 
CreditWatch 0.0623 
 
0.1807 
 
(0.67) 
 
(1.46) 
    
R-square 0.0378   0.1088 
 
 
 
